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Vendor's Right to Compete
the infusion of extraneous passion. The moral health of the community
is strengthened by according even the most miserable and pathetic
criminal those rights which the Constitution has designed for all.. 85
If the American free press were to find the disinterest and intelligence
to comprehend the significance of these last two short sentences, the need
to rehabilitate the dormant and disabled power of contempt would never
arise.
FRANK BERNDT
The Sale of a Business-Restraints Upon the
Vendor's Right to Compete
This note discusses the express and implied obligations which are
legally imposed upon the vendor of a business so as to limit or preclude
him from actively competing with the business he has conveyed to the
vendee. The underlying justification for permitting restrictions to be
placed upon an individual's right to engage in a business of his choice
arises from the fact that in the sale of his business he has transferred, and
has been compensated for, the goodwill which existed therein. The re-
strictions placed upon the vendor of the business vary depending on
whether he has parted with only the goodwill of his prior business or has
also granted to the vendee a covenant not to compete. A transfer of the
goodwill of a business grants to the vendee lesser rights than those he
acquires from the inclusion of a covenant not to compete in the sales con-
tract.
ACQUIRING THE VENDOR'S GOODWILL
By paying an amount in excess of the value of a firm's tangible prop-
erty the vendee can acquire the goodwill present in a vendor's business,
A going business has a value over and above the aggregate value of the
tangible property employed in it. Such excess of value is nothing more
than the recognition that, used in an established business that has won
the favor of its customers, the tangibles may be expected to earn in the
future as they have in the past. The owner's privilege of so using them
and his privilege of continuing to deal with customers attracted by the
established business, are property of value. This latter privilege is
known as goodwill.'
Out of the transfer of the goodwill arise specific restrictions upon the
vendor which prohibit him from derogating from the value of the asset
he has sold.' Inasmuch as the sale of goodwill primarily grants to the
85. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 202 (1952).
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vendee the right to attempt to continue favorable customer relations,3
which the vendor has developed, this right is protected against competi-
tive interference by the vendor. If it were otherwise and the vendor had
the unlimited right to re-engage in a competitive business, he could at-
tract his old customers to his new establishment and thereby destroy the
value of the property right he has sold. To remove such a possibility the
general principle has developed that the sale of a business and its good-
will carries with it an implied obligation that the vendor will do nothing
directly to injure the good disposition of the public towards the old busi-
ness, or impair the advantages and benefits which the vendee has ac-
quired by the purchase of the goodwill.4 Although sound in theory, this
principle has proved to be the source of great difficulty when attempts
are made to apply it to particular factual situations.
Implied Transfer of Goodwill Upon Sale of A Business
The great majority of courts recognize that a contract for the volun-
tary sale of a business, either by express statement or by implication from
the nature of the agreement, transfers the goodwill along with the tan-
gible assets of the vendor's business.' Some courts, going further, have
held that the sale of a firm's assets raises a presumption that goodwill has
passed.6 Other courts have declared that goodwill is parasitic in nature
1. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219, 221-22 (2d Cir. 1929),
rev'd on other grounds, 280 U.S. 384 (1930). Another frequently cited definition is that
goodwill consists of "... every positive advantage that has been acquired by the old firm in
the progress of its business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was
previously carried on, or with the name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying
with it the benefit of the business." Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 522 (1888). In In re
Brown Mr. Justice Cardozo stated that good will is "a reasonable expectancy of preference ...
[which] may come from succession in place or name or otherwise to a business that has won
the favor of its customers." 242 N.Y. 1, 6, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1926).
2. In re Deutz's Estate, 105 N.J. Eq. 671, 149 At. 257 (Ch. 1930); In re Bottomley's
Estate, 92 N.J. Eq. 202, 111 Ad. 605 (Ch. 1920).
3. Basically there are two methods by which the favorable attitudes of customers may be
transferred from one proprietor to another. To accomplish this factual result (1) the trans-
feree can be furnished with all the symbols and other transferable attractions which produce
a favorable customer response and (2) the transferor can be removed as an alternative attrac-
tion. However, regardless of the procedure adopted, the transfer of the goodwill represents
only a reasonable or probable expectancy of future patronage because there is no absolute
guarantee that the customers who patronized the seller will automatically become the pur-
chaser's customers. Note, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 660
(1953).
4. Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 288 P.2d 623 (1955); Patterson v. Rogers,
148 Ark. 222, 229 S.W. 711 (1921).
5. Speed Products Co., Inc. v. Tinnerman Products, Inc., 179 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1949);
Grace Bros. v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949); Pfleghar Hardware Specialty Co. v.
Blair, 30 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1929); Cohen v. Kelm, 119 F. Supp. 376 (D.C. Minn. 1953)5
Horvitz v. Zalkind, 332 Mass. 125, 123 N.E.2d 382 (1954); Haggin v. Derby, 209 Iowa
939, 229 N.W. 257 (1930); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 502 (1959).
6. See Pitman v. J. C. Pitman & Sons, Inc., 324 Mass. 371, 86 N.E.2d 649 (1949) and
cases cited therein.
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and exists only as an incident to other property rights and therefore is not
susceptible of being owned and disposed of separately from the business
to which it is attached.7 This is an extreme position since the majority
of courts are unwilling to declare that the sale of a business will cause an
automatic transfer of goodwill. In- the absence of express words provid-
ing for the transfer of the goodwill, a court may refuse to imply a sale
of this asset, unless the parties' intention to transfer the goodwill can be
reasonably inferred from the sales contract.8 The decisions do, however,
display a distinct willingness on the part of the courts to infer such an
intent from words appearing in a sales contract.9 To prevent any doubt
as to the parties' intentions to transfer the goodwill, it is incumbent upon
the draftsmen of a contract for the sale of a business to include expressly
in the sales contract a statement that the goodwill is being sold along
with the tangible assets thereof. For purposes of further discussion it
will be assumed that the transferee of a business acquires both the tan-
gible assets and the goodwill of the pre-existing organization he has
purchased.
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED UPON THE VENDOR RESULTING
FROM THE SALE OF GOODWILL
As a fundamental rule it is dear that the seller may not derogate
from his own grant, i.e., the vendor is not at liberty to destroy or depre-
ciate the value of the goodwill which he has sold. Therefore, any con-
duct on the part of the vendor that is calculated to impair the value of
the goodwill he has conveyed constitutes a breach of promise, implied
7. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1929), rev'd on
other grounds, 280 U.S. 384 (1930); Pfleghar Hardware Specialty Co. v. Blair, 30 F.2d 614
(2d Cir. 1929); Haggin v. Derby, 209 Iowa 939, 229 N.W. 257 (1930). The concept that
goodwill is parasitic in nature has been developed to the point where one court has stated that
the omission in a sales contract of the mention of goodwill, raises the presumption that it was
the intention of the parties that it should pass with the other assets. Gable v. Carpenter, 136
Neb. 669, 287 N.W. 70 (1939). See In re Gant's Estate, 356 P.2d 707 (Wash. 1960).
8. E.g., Potter v. Colvin, 302 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1957).
9. Cornan v. Graeber Stringing & Wire Mach. Co., 69 F. Supp. 550, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
af'd 160 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1947). Courts have implied such a transfer of the goodwill to the
vendee from a sale of the "stock and fixtures" of the business. Lobeck v. Lee-Clark-Andreesen
Hardware Co., 37 Neb. 158, 55 N.W. 650 (1893). A court presumed the transfer of good-
will from the sale of all the fixtures and equipment used in the operation of a cafeteria busi-
ness, including "each and every other thing used in and about the operation of said cafeteria."
Engstrom v. Larson, 77 N.D. 541, 561, 44 N.W.2d 97, 108 (1950). Goodwill also was
held to pass under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and a sale under such an assign-
ment. Wilmer v. Thomas, 74 Mo. 485, 22 Atl. 403 (1891); Bank of Tomah v. Warren, 94
Wis. 151, 68 N.W. 549 (1896), from evidence that a plant and business were sold as a
going concern. Pfleghar Hardware Specialty Co. v. Blair, 30 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1929).
The theory that goodwill passes by implication can be relied upon to support decisions
holding that when a withdrawing partner transfers his interest in the firm property to the
partners remaining in the firm, he also passes to them his share in the goodwill of the part-
nership business. See, Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 522 (1888); Brass & Iron Works Co.
v. Payne, 50 Ohio St. 115, 33 N.E. 88 (1893).
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in the sale, that he will not disturb the vendee in the enjoyment of his
purchase."° The soundness of this principle is unimpeachable; problems
arise solely from attempts to apply it to particular factual settings.
Voluntary Versus Involuntary Sale of A Business
To crystallize the restraints which the law imposes upon the vendor
who has parted with his business, it is necessary to distinguish between
situations where the vendee acquires the business through a voluntary or
involuntary transfer. In Von Bremen v. MacMonnies," this distinction
was enunciated:
The good will, which the owner thereof parts with in vitum, as in bank-
ruptcy proceedings or by operation of law, as in liquidation of a part-
nership by the lapse of time or its termination pursuant to the articles
of co-partnership, is a lesser property than the good will which is the
subject of a voluntary sale and transfer by the owner for a valuable
consideration. In the first class of cases the former owner remains under
no legal obligation restricting competition on his part in the slightest
degree; in the second class of cases the former owner, by his voluntary
act of sale, has excluded himself from competing with the purchaser of
the good will to the extent of having impliedly agreed that he will not
solicit trade from customers of the old business. To this extent this good
will (acquired at a voluntary sale) is a more valuable property than
the good will of a business (which is acquired through an involuntary
sale).
In short, the protection which a vendee in possession of the goodwill of
a business acquires through voluntary negotiations is greater than the
protection he can expect from the possession of goodwill obtained at an
involuntary sale in which the vendor is being coerced through legal
means to surrender his business.
Vendor's Involuntary Sale of His Business
The courts are unwilling to restrain an individual from attempting
to earn a living where he has been compelled by legal force to forfeit
his business, and where he was normally unable to negotiate freely
with the vendee or assignee as to the terms under which he was willing
to withdraw from the business. In a situation where legal compulsion is
the dominant force behind the sale, it would be unrealistic to say that
the vendor has, by reason of his receipt of consideration for his business
and its goodwill, impliedly promised that he would refrain from doing
10. See Piggly Wiggly Corp. v. Saunders, 1 F.2d 572 (W.D. Tenn. 1924), modified on
other grounds, 30 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1924); Patterson v. Rogers, 148 Ark. 222, 229 S.W.
711 (1921); Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 288 P.2d 632 (1955); Brass & Iron
Works Co. v. Payne, 50 Ohio St. 115, 33 N.E. 88 (1893); Auto Hearse Mfg. Co. v. Bateman,
109 Atd. 735 (N.J. Ch. 1920).
11. 200 N.Y. 41, 51, 93 N.E. 186, 189 (1910).
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anything that would tend to destroy the value of the goodwill. The
courts display sympathy towards an individual who has involuntarily
sold his business and permit the vendor thereof to re-engage in business
and directly compete with the vendee by means of direct solicitation
of his former customers.' The vendee of goodwill of an involuntarily
sold business receives a property right which has little value because
of the fact that no competitive restrictions are placed on the vendor.
Vendor's Voluntary Sale Of His Business: The Majority Rule
The law is far less liberal with a vendor who has voluntarily con-
veyed his business and its goodwill in exchange for a valuable considera-
tion. The leading case, Trego v. Hunt,13 presented the English view on
the subject and represents the view followed by a majority of the courts
in this country. 4 It held that the vendor could compete with the vendee
by using any procedures comparable to the ones that a stranger attempt-
ing to compete with the vendee's business would adopt for such a purpose.
Therefore, he can "set up where he will," can "push his wares as much as
he pleases," and he can "interfere with the customers of his neighbor as
a stranger and outsider might do." 5  The major limitations upon the
vendor's freedom to compete where he has voluntarily parted with his
business are that he cannot capitalize upon any special knowledge which
he has of his previous customers so as to regain that which he has been
compensated for, and that he can be prohibited from approaching his old
12. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 578 (1941); Beauchamp v. United States, 76 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1935); Perkins v.
Becker's Conservatories, Inc., 318 Mass. 407, 61 N.E.2d 833 (1945); In re Brown, 242 N.Y.
1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926); Buffalo Oyster Co. v. Nenno, 132 Misc. 213, 229 N.Y. Supp. 210
(Sup. Ct. 1928); James Van Dyk Co. v. F. V. Reilly Co., 73 Misc. 87, 130 N.Y. Supp. 755(Sup. Ct. 1911); Soeder v. Soeder, 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947). But see, S. F.
Meyers Co. v. Tuttle, 183 Fed. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1910), where sons of the bankrupt transferor
formed a corporation and entered into business in the same location and with the identical
name used by their father. The court found that the sons were attempting to appropriate to
themselves the goodwill of the bankrupt business which had been acquired by the complainant.
It enjoined the sons from performing any act which would naturally tend to induce the pub.
lic into believing that the business formerly conducted by their father was not being carried
on by the purchaser. The injunction included a restraint upon the defendants right to use
the old company name and prevented them from simulating the letterheads and billheads of
their father's former company. However, it can be seen that this case presents special factsjustifying the court's conclusion and it does not undermine the validity of the above stated
principles.
13. [1896] A.C. 7.
14. E.g., Piggly Wiggly Corp. v. Saunders, 1 F.2d 572 (W.D. Tenn. 1924), modified on
other grounds, 30 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1924); Patterson v. Rogers, 148 Ark. 222, 229 S.W.
711 (1921); Farmer's Co-op Elevator of Fowler v. Sturgis & Sons, 226 Mich. 437, 198 N.W.
191 (1924); Suburban Ice Mfg. & Cold Storage Co. v. Mulvihill, 21 Ohio App. 438, 153
N.E. 204 (1926); Note, Limitations Which Result In Law From The Sale Of The Goodwill
Of A Business, 4 BROOKLYN L. REV. 172 (1934).
15. Trego v. Hunt, [1896] A.C. 7, 24; ci. Colton v. Duval, 254 Mich. 346, 237 N.W. 48(1931); Meyers v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N.W. 961 (1884).
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customers under the guise of his former position. 6 From this early pro-
nouncement of the law, subsequent case law has interpreted this to mean
that the vendor can compete in the same locality, 7 and he can make
his rival business known by general public advertising."8 Probably the
strongest legal protection given to the vendee against derogation of the
value of the goodwill he has acquired, is that the vendor will be re-
strained from directly soliciting his old customers.'9 Although personal
solicitation to persuade old customers to deal with him rather than the
vendee is forbidden, indirect, nondeceptive solicitation, by means of gen-
eral advertisements through such media as radio, newspapers, and tele-
vision commercials are allowed.2" In line with this, a court has correctly
refused to enjoin a defendant from doing business with old customers
who were not especially induced by the rival defendant to come to his es-
tablishment, but who rather came solely as a result of exercising their
choice as with whom they wished to deal.2
Under the majority view the vendor is permitted to use his own name
in his rival business,22 unless words to the contrary appear in the sales
16. See Meyers v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N.W. 961 (1884); Hilton v.
Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 182, 104 Ad. 375 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918); Buffalo Oyster Co. v. Nenno,
132 Misc. 213, 229 N.Y. Supp. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Suburban Ice Mfg. Co. v. Mulvihill,
21 Ohio App. 438, 153 N.E. 204 (1926).
17. See Williams v. Farrand, 88 Mich. 473, 487, 50 N.W. 446, 449 (1891); Washburn
v. Dosch, 68 Wis. 436, 32 N.W. 551 (1887).
18. S.F. Myers Co. v. Tuttle, 183 Fed. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J.
Eq. 182, 104 Ad. 375 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918); Snyder Pasteurized Milk Co. v. Burton, 80
N.J. Eq. 185, 83 Atl. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912); Auto Hearse Mfg. Co. v. Bateman, 109
At. 735 (N.J. Ch. 1920).
19. Piggly Wiggly Corp. v. Saunders, I F.2d 572 (W.D. Tenn. 1924), modified on other
grounds, 30 F.2d 385 (6th Cit. 1924); Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, 200 N.Y. 41, 93 N.E.
86 (1940); Buffalo Oyster Co. v. Nenno, 132 Misc. 213, 229 N.Y. Supp. 210 (Sup. Ct.
1928); Suburban Ice Mfg. Co. v. Mulvihill, 21 Ohio App. 438, 153 N.E. 204 (1926). The
restriction imposed upon the vendor's right to solicit directly old customers does not represent
a permanent restraint upon him. Rather, the restriction is to exist only for that length of
time which the court deems is sufficient for the vendee to attach the goodwill to himself. To
hold otherwise, in the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals, would have been unreasonable,
in restraint of trade, and contrary to public policy. Surburban Ice Mfg. Co. v. Mulvihill, supra.
20. See cases cited note 19 supra.
21. Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 182, 104 Ad. 375 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918). In Snyder
Pasteurized Milk Co. v. Burton, 80 N.J. Eq. 185, 83 Al. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912), the
court enjoined the defendant from transacting business with old customers who were obtained
by direct solicitations. Defendants unsuccessfully contended that the old customers might
have returned without solicitation on their part. The court rebutted this by answering that
although this could very well have happened, a person by his own inequitable conduct could
deprive himself of what otherwise he could have rightly claimed.
22. A man's right to use his own name in connection with his business is a fundamental
right. The intention of divesting oneself of it, by transferring his right to another will not
be presumed, but must be clearly shown. Ranft v. Reimers, 200 Ill. 386, 65 N.E. 720 (1902);
Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 182, 104 At. 375 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918); Buffalo Oyster Co.
v. Nenno, 132 Misc. 213, 229 N.Y. Supp. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
A conflict of authority exists as to whether upon the sale or dissolution of a partnership
the purchaser(s), the remaining partner(s) or the withdrawing partner(s) can subsequently
use the old firm's name. In Gable v. Carpenter, 136 Neb. 669, 287 N.W. 70 (1939), it
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contract, but this right will be denied if it is used in a manner calculated
to deceive the public.2" Such deception permits the vendor to 'reap the
benefits of the business he has sold and results in a depreciation or de-
struction of the value of the goodwill for which the vendee has paid. To
prevent this from occurring, the competing vendor can be enjoined from
performing any acts that indicate in any way that he is continuing the
old business, or give the impression that the customers will still be deal-
ing with the same business in which he sold the goodwill. 4
To summarize, as a general rule the voluntary sale of a business and
a fortiorz, the involuntary sale of a business and its goodwill, does not im-
port an agreement by the vendor not to reengage in a competitive busi-
ness, according to the majority of courts. Under circumstances of an in-
voluntary sale the vendor has free reign to compete directly with the busi-
ness conveyed to the best of his abilities. Under the terms of a voluntary
sale, these courts hold that the vendor can be restrained from derogating
from the value of the property he has conveyed, z.e., from any atteriipts
"to decoy it away or call it back before the purchaser has had time to
attach it to himself and make it his very own. 2
5
Minority Views: Massachusetts and Connecticut Rules
Although the doctrine announced in the Trego case, represents tl-f
view followed by the great weight of authority in this country there is
clearly no unanimity of opinion on this question in all jurisdictions within
the United States. By reaching opposite conclusions, the conflicting
views taken by two jurisdictions, Massachusetts and Connecticut, place
the majority view in a middle-of-the-road position.
The Massachusetts courts place far greater restrictions upon the yen-
was held that upon the sale or dissolution of a partnership it is normally the succeeding
partners who acquire the right to carry on the business under the old firm's name. This was
so even though the name of the individual partner selling his interest was the only one that
appeared in the firm's name. Accord, Snyder Mfg. Co. v. Snyder, 54 Ohio St. 86, 43 N.E.
325 (1896). Contra, Annot., 173 A.L.R. 444, 466 (1948). See, Edelman Realty Co. v.
Edelman, 344 Mich. 646, 75 N.W.2d 29 (1956).
23. Neuhoff, Inc. v. Neuhoff Packng Co., 167 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1948); Piggly Wiggly
Corp. v. Saunders, 1 F.2d 572 (W.D. Tenn. 1924), modified on other grounds, 30 F.2d 385
(6h Cir. 1924); Auto Hearse Mfg. Co. v. Bateman, 109 Ad. 735 (N.J. Ch. 1920); see
S. F. Meyers Co. v. Tuttle, 183 Fed. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); Edelman Realty Co. v. Edelman,
344 Mich. 646, 75 N.W.2d 29 (1956).
24. Williams v. Farrand, 88 Mich. 473, 50 N.W 446 (1891); Buffalo Oyster Co. v. Nenno,
132 Misc. 213, 229 N.Y. Supp. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1928). See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Memn,
115 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941)
25. Suburban Ice Mfg. & Cold Storage Co. v. Mulvilhill, 21 Ohio App. 438, 443, 153 N.E.
204, 205 (1926).
26. Cases cited note 15 supra.
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dor's right to compete in a rival business than do the English courts2
While subscribing to the basic premise that the vendor of a business can
do nothing that will derogate from the goodwill he has sold,2" they go
further in implying from the sale of a business and its goodwill a covenant
not to compete.2" Thus this view expands the protection which the ven-
dee receives from the acquisition of the vendor's goodwill. In each case
where the goodwill of a business is voluntarily sold and the vendor sets
up a competing business, it is a question of fact, having regard to the
character of the business sold and the one set up, whether the new busi-
ness is in derogation of the sale." If the factual conclusions sug-
gest this result, then the courts prohibit the vendor from operating his
rival business. This result is accomplished by finding that the vendor,
in consideration of the purchase price he has received for his business
and its goodwill, has impliedly agreed to restrict his freedom to engage
in a competitive business.3 Under this approach the courts are willing
to imply that which in a majority of jurisdictions requires an express
covenant not to compete.
Connecticut and other jurisdictions adopting the Connecticut view are
27. "[ULnder the Massachusetts rule a sale of goodwill precludes the vendor thereof from
again establishing himself in competition to the business sold, though no express contract to
that effect may appear... " Piggly Wiggly Corp. v. Saunders, 1 F.2d 572, 581 (W.D. Tenn.
1924), modified on other grounds, 30 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1924). See Pitman v. J. C. Pitman
& Sons, Inc., 324 Mass. 371, 86 N.E.2d 649 (1949); Auslyn, Inc. v. Rousseau, 321 Mass. 735,
75 N.E.2d 641 (1947).
28. Horvitz v. Zalkind, 332 Mass. 125, 123 N.E.2d 382 (1954); Lynn Tucker Sales, Inc.
v. Le Blanc, 323 Mass. 721, 84 N.E.2d 127 (1949); Perkins v. Becker's Conservatories, Inc.,
318 Mass. 407, 61 N.E.2d 833 (1945); Old Corner Book Store v. Upham, 194 Mass. 101,
80 N.E. 228 (1907). See Franks v. Markson, 337 Mass. 469, 148 N.E.2d 619 (1958);
Pitman v. J. C. Pitman & Sons, Inc., 324 Mass. 371, 86 N.E.2d 649 (1949); Gaines v. Hake,
247 Mass. 88, 141 N.E. 509 (1923).
29. Horvitz v. Zalkind, 332 Mass. 125, 123 N.E.2d 382 (1954); Auslyn, Inc. v. Rousseau,
321 Mass. 735, 75 N.E.2d 641 (1947); Perkins v. Becker's Conservatories, Inc., 318 Mass.
407, 61 N.E.2d 833 (1945). In Martin v. Jablonski, 253 Mass. 451, 456, 149 N.E. 156,
158 (1925) the court stated: "In most cases which have arisen in this court the sale has been
held to be of such a nature and under such circumstances as to preclude the vendor from en-
gaging in [al competing business." See also Pitman v. J. C. Pitman & Sons, Inc., 324 Mass. 371,
86 N.E.2d 649 (1949); Gordon v. Knott, 199 Mass. 173, 85 N.E. 184 (1908).
30. Horvitz v. Zalkind, 332 Mass. 125, 123 N.E.2d 382 (1954); Auslyn, Inc. v. Rousseau,
321 Mass. 735, 75 N.E.2d 641 (1947); Martin v. Jablonski, 253 Mass. 451, 149 N.E. 156
(1925); Marshall Engine Co. v. New Marshall Engine Co., 203 Mass. 410, 89 N.E. 548
(1909); Old Corner Book Store v. Upham, 194 Mass. 101, 80 N.E. 228 (1907).
31. See C. H. Batchelder & Co. v. Batchelder, 220 Mass. 42, 107 N.E. 455 (1914); Foss v.
Roby, 195 Mass. 292, 81 N.E. 199 (1907). But see, Horvitz v. Zalkind, 332 Mass. 125, 123
N.E.2d 382 (1954). In this case the sales contract contained the covenant that defendant
"would not open any store" within a twenty mile radius, for a period of ten years. The court
refused to imply a covenant not to compete any broader than the one which appeared in the
sales contract. In the absence of an express covenant, the court would have enjoined the de-
fendant from competing in any way with the plaintiff. But by stating specifically what ac-
t ivities the defendant could and could not engage in, the court held that the parties intended
to exclude all matters not specifically mentioned and therefore the defendant could compete
through the use of an office.
[VoL 13:1
Vendor's Right to Compete
far more liberal with the vendor32 Under this view the restrictions upon
the vendor's right to compete are enforced only to the extent that they
are explicitly spelled out in the sales contract"33 In the absence of an ex-
press covenant the Supreme Court of Tennessee has refused to infer from
the transfer of goodwill alone any restraint upon the vendor's right to
compete directly with the vendee0 4 This liberal approach in favor of the
vendor makes the acquisition of a firm's goodwill of little value unless a
covenant not to compete is obtained from the seller simultaneously with
the purchase of the business. Otherwise, the vendor may be permitted
to engage in a competing business next door to his old location and can
by direct personal solicitation attempt to do business with his old cus-
tomers.!
From the above discussion it is apparent that the overwhelming ma-
jority of courts impose little restraint upon the vendor from derogating
from his grant and afford the vendee only nominal protection. When
practical consideration is given to the destructive effect which any compe-
tition from a vendor has at a time when the vendee is attempting to es-
tablish himself in his newly-acquired business, it is apparent that the ven-
dee must obtain greater protections than those which are acquired solely
by the purchase of goodwill. This additional protection is available to
the vendee in the form of a covenant not to compete.
COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE
The inclusion of a covenant not to compete in the sales contract is the
device used to broaden the otherwise inadequate protection the vendee
receives from the acquisition of the vendor's goodwill. The presence of
such a restrictive covenant, as an incident to the transfer of the goodwill,
extends its practical value by imposing definite restraints upon the ven-
dor, thereby giving the vendee "total protection" for his investment. A
restrictive covenant should be incorporated into the normal sales con-
tract, inasmuch as it is the only assured means by which the vendee will
be given a full opportunity to reap the benefits of his investment. 8 Cau-
tion, however, must be exercised in the drafting of a restrictive covenant
32. "Upon a sale of the goodwill of a business, without more, the selling party is not pre-
cluded from setting up a precisely similar business at another business stand in the same city,
or even in the vicinity. If the purchaser desired to forestall such a step he must expressly
stipulate against it in the sales contract." Fine v. Lawless, 139 Tenn. 160, 167, 201 S.W.
160, 162 (1918). Cottrell v. Babcock Printing Press Mfg. Co., 54 Conn. 122, 6 Ad. 791
(1886). See also Brown v. Benzinger, 118 Md. 29, 84 At. 79 (1912); Huston v. Dickson,
213 Ore. 115, 322 P.2d 920 (1958).
33. Cases cited note 32, supra.
34. Fine v. Lawless, 139 Tenn. 160, 201 S.W. 160 (1918).
35. All jurisdictions apply the Connecticut rule where there has been an involuntary sale of
the vendor's business.
36. See e.g., Huston v. Dickson, 213 Ore. 115, 322 P.2d 920 (1958).
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if the vendee is to have a reasonable probability of enforcing the covenant
against the vendor. The restraint normally imposed is in the form of
prohibitions upon the vendor's right to compete for a specific period of
time, within a specific territory. It is these factors, the time limitation
and the territorial extent of the restraint, which must be carefully se-
lected to assure enforceability of the covenant. The historical back-
ground and development of the law in this area is helpful in determining
the extent of a legally enforceable restraint in a particular factual situation.
Historical Background
The underlying problem existing in the area of enforcement of restric-
tive covenants arises from the obvious conflict between society's interest in
protecting the freedom of contract and its opposing interest in preserving
the right of an individual to earn a living." Fortunately, this conflict has
been resolved in favor of providing greater protection to the freedom of
contract, i.e., the freedom to sell one's property absolutely. The covenant
not to compete is the means by which an absolute sale of the vendor's
business can be accomplished. This necessarily follows from the fact
that it is only where the vendee can be assured of virtually no competi-
tion from the vendor that he may be wise to invest his money in such a
business. With this in mind, it can be understood that it is the willing-
ness of the courts to enforce such restrictive covenants, though partially
in restraint of trade, that makes goodwill a saleable asset."8
At the common law and now under federal and state antitrust stat-
utes contracts in restraint of trade have been held to be unenforceable.
Therefore, the problem confronting the draftsmen of the restrictive
covenant which is to be included in a sales contract transferring a business
or real property is the necessity of avoiding the danger of having the
covenant declared unenforceable on the grounds that it is an agreement
in restraint of trade."9 The rigidly enforced common-law rule against all
agreements which resulted in any restraint upon trade was modified in
the leading case of Mitchell v. Reynolds,4" which distinguished between
general and partial restraints of trade, and held that a contract providing
37. Caraway v. Flagg, 277 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Attwood v. Lamont, [1920]
3 K.B. 571.
38. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1387 (1951).
39. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1633 at 4576 (Rev. ed. 1937), states: "Any bargain or
contract which purports to limit in any way the right of either party to work or to do business,
whether as to the character of the work or business, its place, the manner in which it shall
be done . . . can be called a bargain . . . in restraint of trade." See also Cameron v. Int'l
Alliance, 119 N.J. Eq. 577, 183 Atd. 157 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 659;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 513 (1932).
40. 1 P. Wins. (1711). See Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588
(1915), for a discussion of the historical development relative to the enforceability of re-
strictive covenants.
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for the latter to be enforceable if reasonably restricted as to time and ter-
ritory. Although the distinction which the court made between general
and partial restraints is today invalid,4 the value of the decision is never-
theless preserved because the language used suggests the now recognized
principle that restraints which are reasonably necessary to protect the
vendee against competition from the vendor should be enforced. 2 In
United States i. Addyston Pipe and Steel Company,43 the court held that
one of the five general classes of restraints which are legally enforceable
is an agreement "by the seller of property or business not to compete with
the buyer in such a way as to derogate from the value of the property
sold or business sold."44
Creating Enforceable Covenants - Factors To Be Considered:
Reasonableness As To The Parties
The law is dear that restrictive covenants against competition, though
in partial restraint of trade, are enforceable if they are reasonable to the
covenantee, coveriantor, and to the public. In the overwhelming ma-
jority of jurisdictions, it is also quite dear that unless an express state-
ment that the vendor agrees not to compete with the vendee is incorpo-
rated into the sales contract, no such agreement will be enforced.45 The
basis for the objection to such covenants, namely that they are in restraint
of trade, displays itself in the form of unreasonable restrictions as to time
or territory. The enforceability of a restrictive covenant is therefore de-
pendent upon the reasonableness of the time to which the covenant has
been limited and the area in which the covenant is operative."
Since the key to the enforceability of restrictive covenants is their
reasonableness as to time and territorial limitations, a determination
of this can only be made after an examination of all the facts and circum-
41. 6 CoRmN, CONTRACTS § 1386 (1951).
42. Ibid.
43. 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
44. Id. at 281. In this article, the discussion of restrictive covenants is generally limited to
their effect upon conveyances of business and real estate. A conflict exists as to whether
principles developed in this area are applicable to covenants between employers and em-
ployees. See, Note, Trade Regulations: Employer Protection from Employee Competition
after a Term of Employment, 4 OHIo ST. L. J. 263 (1939).
Recent cases, other than those discussed in the above note, which may prove helpful in
further disclosing the present status of Ohio law are: Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 119
S.E.2d 533 (S.C. 1961); Welcome Wagon Service Co., v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.X.2d
757 (1942); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104 Ohio App. 8, 146 NL8.2d 447 (1957);
Hance Bottled Gas v. Peacock, 169 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
45. Cases cited notes 14 and 15 supra.
46. Wawak Co. v. Kaiser, 90 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1937); Bloom v. Home Ins. Co., 91 Ark.
367, 121 S.W. 293 (1909); Mattis v. Lally, 138 Conn. 51, 82 A.2d 155 (1951); Dairymen's
League Co-op Ass'n v. Weckele, 160 Misc. 866, 291 N.Y. Supp. 704 (Sup. Ct. 1936); RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 514 (1932).
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stances of each case."' The fact that the general rule is one of reason-
ableness indicates that the desirable result in individual cases depends en-
tirely upon the particular circumstances involved.
[T]he validity of a contract in partial restraint of trade or business is
not to be determined by the arbitrary measures of extent in time, extent
in space, and the like, but by its reasonableness under all the circum-
stances having regard both for the liberty of a person to make beneficial
use of his own, and for the public consequence of such use.48
Bearing this in mind, no attempt to set forth any exact number of years
or exact territory in which a restraint for a particular type of business can
be enforceably imposed will be made in this note. An exhaustive pres-
entation of decisions, classified into various common categories of busi-
nesses, years of restraint, and territory of such restraint has already been
assembled. 9
The term "reasonable" has different meanings and requirements
when examined in light of the interests of the various parties who are
affected by the transaction out of which the restrictive covenant is pro-
duced. For this reason, the cases commonly divide the question of rea-
sonableness into three independent categories, that is, reasonableness as to
the covenantor, to the covenantee, and to the public. 0
Reasonableness As To The Covenantee
One basic requirement which must be satisfied to prevent the cove-
nant from being rendered unenforceable is that the restraint can be no
greater than is necessary for the protection of that which the covenantee
has purchased.51 Inasmuch as the reason for the restraint is to protect
the purchaser in the enjoyment of the goodwill he has paid for, there is
no justification for a restraining period in excess of the time that the
goodwill can reasonably be expected to continue." The purchase of the
vendor's goodwill is generally understood to grant to the vendee only the
47. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., the court gave recognition to the inherent
difficulties involved in defining the term "reasonable." It states that the term is so vague
because of its common usage as a "convenient summary of the dominant considerations which
control in the application of legal doctrines." 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). Bancroft & Rich
v. Union Embossing Co., 72 N.H. 402, 57 Atl. 97 (1903); Nat'l Ben Co. v. Union Hosp. Co.,
45 Minn. 272, 47 N.W. 806 (1891).
48. Mills v. Ressler, 87 Kan. 549, 551, 125 Pac. 58, 60 (1912).
49. Annots., 45 A.L.R.2d 77 (1956); 46 A.L.R.2d 119 (1956).
50. Two recent cases which have adopted this procedure in measuring the reasonableness
of a restrictive covenant are Welcome Wagon, Inc. v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir.
1955); Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 119 S.E.2d 533 (S.C. 1961).
51. See Wren v. Pearah, 220 Ark. 888, 249 S.W.2d 985 (1952); Wright v. Marshall, 182
Ark. 890, 33 S.W.2d 43 (1930); L. H. Henry & Sons v. Rhinesmith, 219 Iowa 1088, 260
N.W. 9 (1935); Morehead City Sea Food Co., Inc. v. Way, 169 N.C. 679, 86 S.E. 603
(1915); Herbert v. Bush & Co., 42 Tenn. App. 1, 4, 298 S.W.2d 747, 751 (1956).
52. 6 CoRBiN, CoNmAcrs § 1391 (1951).
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limited right to establish himself favorably with his predecessor's cus-
tomers and is not considered to be an asset from which the vendee can
expect to derive unlimited benefit. This concept suggests a valuable
measuring rod in ascertaining a reasonable degree of restraint. To make
the restraint reasonable it should be imposed only as long as the personal
business and customer relationships of the seller are still such that his
competitive business would attract old customers from the buyer. There-
fore, the vendor should not be restrained beyond a period of time at
which his re-entry into the business would have no greater adverse effect
upon the purchaser's business than would similar competition from an
absolute stranger.5" Generally speaking, the greater the importance of
the "personal element" of the vendor, the longer the restraining period
needed to dispel the competitive advantage of the seller. For example,
a professional practitioner who purchases a practice is justified in placing
a restriction of longer duration upon the seller.54 On the other hand,
a retail business normally requires only a relatively short period of pro-
tection. This is explained by the fact that customers normally visit sucfi
stores at relatively short intervals and after patronizing the old establish-
ment, it is unlikely that the seller can regain his advantageous position
with them after a relatively short period of time. However, like all gen-
eralizations, the above example could well prove to be erroneous in a par-
ticular transaction.
Reasonableness As To The Covenantor
Justifiably, the interests or hardships upon the vendor should be given
the least consideration in determining the reasonableness of the covenant.
It is the writer's opinion that a party who has voluntarily exercised his
will and has decided to accept valuable consideration for his business and
the goodwill therein, should be shown little sympathy by a court of law.
At the time of signing the sales agreement the vendor is fully apprised
of the degree of the restraint which he is willingly accepting as a limi-
tation upon his basic right to earn a living. A later change of heart de-
serves no great consideration. Courts should, and generally do assume
this position and display strong reluctance to aid such individuals in their
attempts to dissolve an important part of their bargain.55 It is only in
those few cases where the covenant is found to place an impossible hard-
53. Ibid.
54. Webster v. Williams, 62 Ark. 101, 34 S.W. 537 (1896). The court permanently en-
joined a physician from practicing where he had expressly agreed to retire from practice. See
also Storer v. Brock, 351 IMI. 643, 184 NE. 868 (1933); Styles v. Lyon, 87 Conn. 23, 86
Ad. 564 (1913).
55. See Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 Pac. 430 (1913); Mattis v.
Lally, 138 Conn. 51, 82 A.2d 155 (1951); Yanko v. Goldberg, 101 N.J. Eq. 170, 137 AtL
645 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927); Stephens v. Pahl, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377 (1921).
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ship upon the vendor that such an agreement is struck down on grounds
of being unreasonable to the vendor.56
Reasonableness As To The Public
The last element comprising the concept of reasonableness, as ap-
plied to time and territorial limitations in restrictive covenants, is that
such restrictions must be reasonable for the general public. It is clear
that this element is an independent factor which must be given indepen-
dent consideration.
It is not the interest of the parties alone, which in the eye of the law
are to be considered the true test, but in each particular case, under the
facts, the judicial inquiry is: Will it be inimical to the public interest?
If so, then, and in that event, the agreement must be held as hostile to
public policy, and therefore, void.57
Therefore, even though the restraint may be reasonable between the
parties, it still can be found to be injurious to the public interest to the
extent that public policy requires it to be declared void.58
One of the alleged sources of possible injury to the general public is
that the elimination of the covenantor from freely participating in a com-
petitive manner with the covenantee deprives the public of the benefits
which normally flow from such competition. However, the contention
that the severe limitations placed upon the covenantor result in the
stifling of competition should not, in and of itself, render the restraint
unreasonable as to the general public. Little weight is given to this
public policy argument because the courts correctly hold that the public
has as great an interest in the freedom and enforcement of contracts as it
has in maintaining the freedom of competition.59 Further, this argument
loses any remaining strength when one considers that the restriction upon
the vendor's right to compete within a particular locality certainly does
not limit anyone else's right to enter a competitive business within the
restricted area."0
The second possible source of injury to the public is that the enforce-
ment of such a restriction results in the community's being deprived of
56. See Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 51 NE. 1048 (1895); Lynch
v. Bailey, 275 App. Div. 527, 90 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 615, 90 NE.2d
484 (1949).
57. Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 561, 41 NE. 1048, 1050 (1895);
see Tarr v. Stearnman, 264 II. 110, 105 N.E. 957 (1914).
58. See Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 Pac. 430 (1913); Tarr v. Steam-
man, 264 Ill. 110, 105 N.E. 957 (1914); Boggs v. Friend, 77 W. Va. 531, 87 S.E. 873
(1916).
59. Reeves v. Sargeant, 200 S.C. 494, 497, 21 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1942); Nelson v. Brassing-
ton, 64 Wash. 180, 116 Pac. 629 (1911).
60. Hultsman v. Carroll, 177 Ark. 432, 6 S.W.2d 551 (1928); Robbins v. Plant, 174 Ark.
639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927); Hursen v. Gavin, 162 Ill. 377, 44 N.E. 735 (1896).
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the covenantor's specialized skill, talent, or profession. This approach,
independent of any others, is not sufficiently convincing to be sustained.6
It can be cogently attacked by the argument that the sale of a business or
professional practice normally results only in a substitution of owner-
ship rather than the removal of the business unit from the competitive
market.
The one area where restraint, in and of itself, is commonly found to
be against public policy and therefore void, is where it is shown that the
purpose for which the covenant was created was solely to suppress compe-
tition, thereby creating a monopoly0 2
Factors to be Considered: Reasonable
Territorial and Time Limitations
Territorial Limitations
There is an apparent conflict in the cases as to the extent of terri-
torial limits which can enforceably be included in the covenant not to
compete. Some courts hold that the determining factor which establishes
the permissible territorial limits of the restraint is the territorial extent
in which the business purchased transacted its business.6" Under this
view, area included in the restriction is unreasonable if it includes terri-
tory into which the buyer afterwards extends his business or territory in
which the buyer himself was doing business prior to the purchase."
Other courts taking a more liberal view, hold that the territorial scope
of the restraint can include territory into which the business might rea-
sonably be expected to expand.65 This latter view seems to be far more
consistent with the normal objective of a purchaser to expand and de-
velop the business he has acquired.
Time Limitations
A promise not to compete, unlimited as to time, will not be held un-
61. Burdine v. Brooks, 206 Ga. 12, 55 S.E.2d 605 (1949); Tarry v. Johnston, 114 Neb.
496, 208 N.W. 615 (1926).
62. -I1rding y. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 55 NE. 577 (1899); Consumers' Oil
Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 NE. 1048 (1895); see Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195,
63 A.2d 161 (1949).
63. John T. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, 53 F.2d 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); General Bronze
Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932).
64. Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910
(1953); see Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469, 16 N.E. 299 (1888). Contra, North Shore
Dye House v. Rosenfield, 53 R.I. 279, 166 At. 346 (1933).
65. See Knapp v. S. Jarvis Adams Co., 135 Fed. 1008 (6th Cir. 1905); Losquadro Coal
Corp. v. Rubel Corp., 86 F. Supp. 774 (D.N.J. 1949); C. W. Swingle & Co. v. Reynolds,
140 Neb. 693, 1 N.W.2d 307 (1941); Schultz v. Johnson, 110 NJ. Eq. 566, 160 At. 379
(Ct Err. & App. 1932).
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reasonable per se." The time limitation placed upon the restraint is an
important factor to be considered in a determination of reasonableness,
but it is not conclusive. The modern trend is to enforce restrictive cove-
nants which are unlimited as to time if they are reasonable in all other
respects."7 Many courts uphold contracts containing unlimited restraints
upon time by implying that the restraint is enforceable for a reasonable
period of time.68 Similarily, agreements which are reasonable in all re-
spects but contain no express limitation as to territory are frequently up-
held by interpreting the contract as providing for a reasonable limitation
in light of all the surrounding circumstances." An early case upheld a
restrictive covenant which imposed an unlimited restriction as to time
where the nature and the surrounding facts justified the conclusion that
it was reasonable." It is the writer's opinion that as long as the basic
purpose for the execution of restrictive covenants, that is, to protect the
goodwill that the vendee has acquired, by preventing the vendor's re-
entry into business, is furthered, such determinations by the courts are
desirable. Such covenants should be upheld despite the fact that their
broad restrictions have been attacked on the ground of placing too great
a hardship upon the covenantor.7
Divisibility of Covenants
Although a covenant is found to be unreasonable, it may be severed
and enforced to the extent of giving reasonable protection to the vendee.
A growing majority of jurisdictions permits the partial enforcement of
"divisible" covenants if the part of the area in which enforcement would
be reasonable is by the wording of the instrument, readily ascertainable.7"
These rules are merely remnants of the common-law "blue-penciling"
test by which English courts severed a covenant if it was so worded that
the unreasonable elements might be lined out with a "blue pencil" and
the remaining elements treated as an independently enforceable con-
66. Scott v. McReynolds, 293 Tenn. App. 289, 255 S.W.2d 401 (1952). See Huer v.
Rubin, 1 N.J. 251, 62 A.2d 812 (1949); United Dye Works v. Strom, 179 Wash. 41, 35
P.2d 760 (1934); 6 CoRBiN, CoNTRAaTs § 1391 (1951).
67. Hicklin v. O'Brien, 11 I1. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 541 (1956); Prentice v. Rowe,
324 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. App. 1959); Krueger, Hutchinson & Overton Clinic v. Lewis, 266
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). See Griffin v. Guy, 172 Md. 510, 192 At. 359 (1937);
Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill. 643, 184 N.E. 868 (1923).
68. See for example Tarry v. Johnston, 114 Neb. 496, 208 N.W. 615 (1926).
69. Prame v. Ferrell, 166 Fed. 702 (6th Cir. 1909); Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35
S.E. 586 (1900).
70. Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588 (7th Cir. 1915).
71. See Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921).
72. Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See Gen-
eral Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 208 Wis. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932). For a discussion of
this area see 5 WLLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1659 (Rev. ed. 1937); 6 CoRBn N, CoNTRAcrs 5
1390 (1951).
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tract.7" The modern trend of the law, as Professor Williston suggests,7"
is that of severance and partial enforcement of covenants, although the
covenant itself may be indivisible. This approach appears sound only
where there is proof that the covenant has not deliberately been made
oppressive so as to insure partial enforcement rather than none at all.
CONCLUSION
The sale of goodwill, ancillary to the sale of a business by itself, does
not provide adequate assurance to the purchaser that he will be protected
in the enjoyment of the benefits he has paid for. The majority rule,
which permits competition by the vendor, has led to the use of the
covenant not to compete. Such a covenant, ancillary to an agreement to
purchase a business, should be considered an indispensable part of the
sales contract. A restrictive covenant, though partially in restraint of
trade, can be enforced against the vendor ff it is reasonable and imposed
only to the extent necessary to preserve the value of the goodwill.
As has been shown, the entire concept which regulates the enforce-
ability of the covenant not to compete is dominated by the requirement
that the restraint be a reasonable one. Only after careful consideration
of the particular factual circumstances should an attempt be made to deter-
mine the number of years and the territorial boundaries from which the
vendor is to be restrained. An attempt to impose too great a restraint
upon the vendor can very well lead to great hardships in the future for
the vendee.
The development of the law in this area suggests a more liberal con-
sideration of the vendee's right and has resulted in a growing tendency
to permit greater restraints to be imposed upon the vendor. This means
that the vendor must exercise greater caution prior to restricting volun-
tarily his freedom to earn a living. However, upon acceptance of the
covenant, his future rights to compete should be absolutely settled and
subsequent attempts to breach the agreement should be prohibited. The
growing trend towards favoring the vendee is a desirable one and in
accord with modern business practices.
ALAN B. SOCLOF
73. Authorities cited note 72 supra; Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 2 K.B. 146, 155.
74. 5 WLLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1660 (1951). But see, Somerset v. Reyner, 233 S.C.
324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958).
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